tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9179627242645780373.post6327155567397400299..comments2023-10-26T02:29:30.037-07:00Comments on The Masked Thomist: An Intersting Argument about Ethics.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11211076010977403016noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9179627242645780373.post-64100660884810031192013-06-10T17:28:21.828-07:002013-06-10T17:28:21.828-07:00Jason, I haven't read Fincke's blog in det...Jason, I haven't read Fincke's blog in detail, so I don't know what his settled metaphysical views in fact are. So my comments are going off your representation of Fincke. It sounds like Fincke is using the second prong of his argument as the 'metaphysical base', as it were, for the first prong of his argument. I.e., if his second prong actually holds, then the first prong will follow. So my concern is with your take on his second prong. You say that the desirability of developing our powers is neither self-evident nor intuitively obvious nor clear to everyone. I agree with you there to an extent. However you seem to be arguing that knowledge/understanding of metaphysics is *prior* to knowledge/understanding of the moral desirability of fulfilling powers. If that is your view I think I might disagree with you there. Our access to, and knowledge of truths in the order of practical reason is independent of our access to, and knowledge of truths in the order of theoretical reason. (To this extent alone are New Natural Law theorists correct). For instance anyone on the street with no settled view on metaphysics could agree with you that (all other things being equal) stronger is better than weaker, being perfect is better than being imperfect, and so on. I.e., they have accepted that perfection and fulfilment are natural goods, and insofar as they do, they also see fulfilled and perfected powers as being better than unfulfilled and imperfect ones (and this independently of any prior substantive metaphysical positions). I'm sure you could grant that much to Fincke. Perhaps, however, you simply making the point that certain metaphysical truths are *ontologically* prior to truths about the moral life (including truths about whether or not we should fulfil our powers). I'd agree with you there. But on this reading you still make the weaker claim that as a matter of fact, many people will not come to the moral beliefs that Fincke discusses "absent [the requisite] metaphysical beliefs". Do you mean things like the existence of God (?). If so I still wouldn't agree with you. Perhaps, then, you are again making a different point—if so perhaps you could clarify and help me out. It just seems to me that Fincke isn't doing anything obviously wrong here other than his holding metaphysical views (atheism) that are inconsistent with the metaphysical views implied by his ethics (i.e., Aristotelian teleology). I.e., He's made a metaphysical stumble; but I don't see how that invalidates his ethical positions where they *are* grounded in metaphysical truths he *has* understood (e.g. that powers are real and their fulfilment is good).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com